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Issue BRIEF
STABILIZING INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKETS WITH SUBSIDIZED REINSURANCE
Scott E. Harrington, PhD

Subsidized reinsurance represents a potentially important tool to help stabilize individual health insurance markets. This brief describes
alternative forms of subsidized reinsurance and the mechanisms by which they spread risk and reduce premiums. It summarizes specific
state initiatives and Congressional proposals that include subsidized reinsurance. It compares approaches to each other and to more
direct subsidies of individual market enrollment. For a given amount of funding, a particular program’s efficacy will depend on how it
affects insurers’ risk and the risk margins built into premiums, incentives for selecting or avoiding risks, incentives for coordinating and
managing care, and the costs and complexity of administration. These effects warrant careful consideration by policymakers as they
consider measures to achieve stability in the individual market in the long term.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA)
fundamentally transformed individual health
insurance markets and significantly expanded
coverage. But markets in many states remain
unstable, partly due to disproportionate
enrollment by older and sicker enrollees. While
ACA subsidies to households below 400% of
poverty (Advance Premium Tax Credits, or
APTCs) limit the impact of rising premiums
on most current enrollees, unbalanced risk
pools and resulting premiums discourage
take up of coverage by many people eligible
for little or no subsidy. Total individual market
enrollment is much lower than projected when
the ACA was passed, and it declined in 2017
as premiums jumped and insurers withdrew in
many states.1
Federal and state officials are considering
stabilizing the individual market through some
type of subsidized reinsurance program,
including so-called “invisible high risk pools.”2
The House’s American Health Care Act, the
Senate’s Better Care Reconciliation Act, and
several state waiver requests under Section
1332 of the ACA all include subsidized
reinsurance provisions.3 Subsidized reinsurance
combines significant external subsidies to the

individual market with some degree of risk
spreading through reinsurance. It contrasts with
commercial reinsurance arrangements (and
certain government authorized or mandated
reinsurance programs), which spread risk
among and between insurers without an
external subsidy, and with possible direct
subsidization of the individual market without
reinsurance.
Traditional high risk pools operated in most
states before 2014, when insurers could
underwrite and price coverage based on health
status. People unable to obtain coverage due
to pre-existing conditions could do so in a
separate risk pool, typically at higher than
“standard” but subsidized premium rates, thus
insulating the underwritten market from the
cost of insuring these high risks.4 Under the
ACA’s current structure, some form of supplyside subsidy to the individual market could
serve a similar role, lowering premiums and
increasing take up of coverage by younger/
healthier enrollees, thus putting further
downward pressure on premiums.
This issue brief describes alternative forms
of subsidized reinsurance to help stabilize

individual health insurance, and compares
them with possible direct subsidies of
individual market enrollment. It summarizes
specific state initiatives and Congressional
proposals that include subsidized reinsurance
programs. Assuming a comparable amount
of external funding, it then discusses the
potential effects of alternative approaches
on insurers’ risk and risk margins in premiums;
incentives for risk selection; incentives for care
management, coordination, and cost control;
and the costs and complexity of administration.

REINSURANCE AS A
SUBSIDY MECHANISM
Under the ACA’s system of guaranteed issue
and community rating, insurers price coverage
based on average expected claim costs for
the overall risk pool, with enrollee premiums
tailored to age and type of plan. External
funding through some form of reinsurance will
reduce insurers’ average expected costs (net of
the funding), with premium reductions spread
broadly among enrollees. For a given amount
of funding, a particular program’s effects will
depend on its impact on the cost of coverage,

COLONIAL PENN CENTER | 3641 LOCUST WALK | PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104-6218 | LDI.UPENN.EDU | P: 215-898-5611 | F: 215-898-0229 |

@PENNLDI

LDI
and the ability of lower premiums to attract a
healthier mix of enrollees and expand overall
enrollment to help achieve economies of scale
in non-claim costs.
Table 1 summarizes key features of three
approaches to providing subsidized reinsurance,
along with the alternative of providing direct
per enrollee subsidies.
Per enrollee reinsurance (also known as
“stop loss” or “specific excess” reinsurance),
reimburses a percentage of an enrollee’s
annual claim costs between a threshold and
a maximum claim amount. It was used in the
ACA’s transitional reinsurance program during
2014-16 and remains a part of Medicare Part D.5
Invisible high risk pools (a form of conditionbased reinsurance) reimburse a percentage of
claims above a threshold for all enrollees with
specified health conditions. Programs may also
give insurers the discretion to enroll others
based on enrollee health status statements.
Aggregate coinsurance (also known
as “quota share” reinsurance) simply
reimburses a percentage of all claims during
a year, regardless of size or underlying health
condition. It is roughly analogous to federalstate sharing of costs under Medicaid, and to
overall federal funding of Medicare Part D.
A per enrollee subsidy pays a specified
flat amount per enrollee per month or year.
It is analogous to basic federal payments
(before risk adjustment) to support Medicare
Advantage, and to per capita allotment
proposals for federal Medicaid funding.
Potential external funding sources include
federal or state government funds, assessments
on insured and self-insured plan enrollees, and
assessments on providers. Any assessments
linked to the individual market or requiring
individual market insurers to pay for reinsurance
would reduce the impact on premiums. To the
extent that external funding reduces premiums
in general and specifically for second lowest
cost Silver plans, federal APTCs will decline,
thus reducing or possibly eliminating the net
cost of additional funding. Such “pass through
funding” based on projected federal savings
from lower APTCs has been integral to
reinsurance proposals in Section 1332 waiver
applications.6
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TABLE 1.
Subsidized Reinsurance and Direct Subsidies
Mechanism

Description

Examples / similar mechanisms

Per enrollee reinsurance

Reimburses percentage of enrollee
annual claims between a threshold and
cap; insurer may pay a fee towards
cost of program

Medicare Part D catastrophe
reinsurance; ACA transitional
reinsurance; Minnesota Section 1332
waiver request

Invisible high risk pool (conditionspecific reinsurance)

Reimburses percentage of enrollee
annual claims above a threshold for
enrollees with specified conditions;
may permit reinsurance of other
enrollees at insurer’s discretion; insurer
pays part or all of enrollee premium

Maine 2012-2013; Alaska 2017 and
Section 1332 approved waiver 2018;
American Health Care Act (H.R.
1628)

Aggregate coinsurance

Reimburses percentage of all claims
during year

Federal matching rates for Medicaid;
combined federal funding of direct
subsidy and reinsurance for Medicare
Part D

Per enrollee subsidy

Pays flat amount per enrollee per
month

Basic Medicare Advantage payment
(before risk adjustment)

TABLE 2.
Subsidized Per Enrollee Reinsurance Programs
Plan

Coverage

Funding

Medicare Part D reinsurance

Federal government pays 80% of
annual enrollee spending above
catastrophic threshold (plan 15%,
enrollee 5%)

Federal reinsurance payments and
direct subsidy fund 74.5% of total plan
costs (more for low income enrollees)

ACA transitional reinsurance

2014: 100% of claims between $45,000
and $250,000
2015: 55% of claims between $45,000
and $250,000
2016: projected 53% of claims between
$90,000 and $250,000

Assessments for all individual, group,
and self-insured enrollees ($63
PMPM in 2014, $44 in 2015, $27 in
2016)

American Health Care Act (H.R. 1628)

Patient and State Stability Fund
includes default federal reinsurance
program to reimburse 75% of annual
claims for an enrollee between
$50,000 and $350,000

$100 billion 2018-2026 for default
federal reinsurance or alternative state
grants; state matching of 10% in 2020
growing to 50% in 2024 for default
reinsurance (7% in 2020 to 50% in
2026 for alternative programs)

Better Care Reconciliation Act (Senate
alternative to H.R. 1628)

State Stability and Innovation Program
includes short-term funding for
reinsurance program during 20182021 (details determined by HHS
Secretary), and separate long-term
funding for 2019-2026 that can include
reinsurance

$50 billion for short-term program
reinsurance with no state match; $132
billion for long-term program, which
can include reinsurance, with state
match of 7% in 2022 growing to 35%
in 2026

Individual Health Insurance
Marketplace Improvement Act (S.
1354)

80% of annual claims for an enrollee
between $50,000 ($100,000
beginning in 2021) and $500,000
(amounts indexed for increase in
average premiums after 2018)

All funding necessary to carry out the
program

Minnesota Premium Security Plan
(pending Section 1332 waiver request)

80% of annual claims for an enrollee
between $50,000 and $250,000 in
2018; 50-80% of claims between
$50,000 or more and $250,000 or less
after 2018

$271 million in funding in 2018 with
projected APTC and Basic Health
Plan pass through funding of $139
million - $167 million and state
funding of the remainder

Iowa’s Proposed Stopgap Measure
(pending)

85% of claims between $100,000 and
$3 million and 100% of claims above $3
million (60% of claims above $1 million
covered by Federal High-Cost Risk
Pooling Program)

Projected cost of $80 million in 2018
funded by APTC and reduced Cost
Sharing Reduction pass through
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PER ENROLLEE REINSURANCE
Table 2 provides a more detailed summary of
subsidized per enrollee reinsurance programs.7
This approach has been used to partially
subsidize “catastrophic” claims under Medicare
Part D since its inception. As implemented,
the ACA’s transitional reinsurance program
reimbursed 100% of enrollee claims in a year
between $45,000 and $250,000 for 2014, 55.1%
of claims between $45,000 and $250,000 for
2015, and a projected 52.9% of claims between
$90,000 and $250,000 for 2016. The program
was funded by assessments for all individual,
group, and self-insured enrollees, thus providing
a net subsidy to the individual market, which is
believed to have lowered premiums by 10%-15%
in 2014 and declined over time.
The American Health Care Act (H.R. 1628)
passed by the House in May would provide
substantial federal funding for a Patient and
State Stability Fund during 2018-2026, with
required state matching of funding beginning
in 2020. While states could design alternative
programs, the default stabilization program was
per enrollee reinsurance, which would reimburse
75% of an enrollee’s annual claim costs between
$50,000 and $350,000. The Senate Republican
substitute bill, the Better Care Reconciliation
Act, included substantial funding for a shortterm reinsurance program during 2018-2021
with no state matching required and with
program details to be determined by the HHS

Secretary. It included additional long-term
funding for state programs that could include
reinsurance, with some state funding eventually
required.
On the Democrat side, Senators Carper,
Kaine, and others introduced the Individual
Health Marketplace Improvement Act (S.
1354) to establish federally funded per enrollee
reinsurance that in 2018 would reimburse
80% of an enrollee’s annual claims between
$50,000 ($100,000 in 2021) and $500,000.
The thresholds would be indexed to growth in
average premiums after 2018. The bill does not
specify the amount of funding but indicates
that all necessary funding will be provided to
carry out the program.
At the state level, and in the face of large
premium increases and declining enrollment,
Minnesota used more than $300 million in
emergency funding to provide 25% premium
rebates to non-APTC eligible individual market
enrollees for 2017. It subsequently applied for
a Section 1332 waiver (pending) to establish
the Minnesota Premium Security Plan.8 This
reinsurance plan would reimburse 80% of an
enrollee’s annual claims between $50,000 and
$250,000 in 2018, with possible changes in
the sharing percentage and thresholds after
2018. (The state’s application also indicates
that it will “strongly consider moving to a
conditions-based model” beginning in 2019.)
The projected required funding of $271 million
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in 2018, projected to reduce premiums by
20%, includes estimated pass through savings
of $139 million to $167 million from reduced
federal APTCs and reduced federal funding of
Minnesota’s Basic Health Plan, with the state
funding the remainder.
Facing large premium increases and the
possibility of not having any Marketplace
insurers in 2018, Iowa applied to HHS for
emergency funding in June to stabilize its
individual market.9 The state’s Proposed
Stopgap Measure would reimburse 85% of
annual enrollee claims between $100,000 and
$3 million and 100% of claims above $3 million.
Sixty percent of the reimbursement for claims
above $1 million would come from the Federal
High-Cost Risk Pooling Program (see note 7).
The application projects that an additional cost
of $80 million in 2018 can be funded primarily
by reduced federal APTCs.

INVISIBLE HIGH RISK POOLS
Table 3 provides additional details on invisible
high risk pools in Maine, Alaska, and the
proposed American Health Care Act.10
Facing large premium increases and declining
insurer participation in its individual market
with guaranteed issue and age-adjusted
community rating, in 2011 Maine established
the Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance
Association (MGARA) as an invisible high

TABLE 3.
Subsidized Invisible High Risk Pool Programs
Maine

Alaska

AHCA proposed amendment
(Palmer)

Entity

Maine Guaranteed Access
Reinsurance Association

Alaska Reinsurance Program

Federal Invisible High Risk Pool

Federal Invisible Risk Sharing
Program

Effective

July 1, 2012 – December 31, 2013

January 1, 2017; Section 1332 waiver
January 1, 2018

January 1, 2018

January 1, 2018

Mandatory reinsurance

8 health conditions at time of issue

33 health conditions at issue or during year

8 health conditions at issue plus any
others designated by HHS Secretary

Determined by HHS Secretary

Voluntary reinsurance

Permitted at issue

Not permitted

Permitted at issue

Determined by HHS Secretary

Reimbursement

90% of amount above $7,500 up
to $32,500; 100% above $32,500

100%

100% of claims above $10,000;
providers reimbursed at Medicare rates

Determined by HHS Secretary

Reinsurance premium

90% of enrollee premium

100% of enrollee premium

90% of enrollee premium

Determined by HHS Secretary

Other funding

$4 PMPM for individual and
group insurance and third-party
administered self-insured plans

$55 million from general state premium
taxes in 2017; projected $52 million in
APTC pass through funding in 2018

No provision

$15 billion from Treasury during
2018-2026

AHCA adopted amendment
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risk pool. MGARA operated from July 1, 2012
until the ACA’s transitional reinsurance began
on January 1, 2014.11 Insurers had to reinsure
(“cede”) all enrollees with one or more of
eight health conditions at the time coverage
was issued. Insurers could also voluntarily
cede enrollees based on an enrollee health
statement. MGARA reimbursed 90% of a
reinsured enrollee’s annual claims between
$7,500 and $32,500 and 100% of claims above
$32,500. To fund the program, insurers had
to cede 90% of the premium for reinsured
enrollees, and all individual, group, and thirdparty administered self-insured health plans
were assessed $4 per member per month.
The Maine program’s impact on premiums
and coverage take up is uncertain.12 While
the state’s largest insurer estimated that
MGARA accounted for a 20% rate reduction,
its adoption coincided with expansion of the
state’s age rating band and changes in required
benefits and allowed cost sharing. Previous
enrollees were allowed to retain coverage at the
old rating rules, thus resulting in old and new
risk pools, with younger enrollees more likely to
migrate to the new rules and pool.
Under the Alaska Reinsurance Program,
which took effect January 1, 2017, insurers
had to reinsure enrollees with one or more of
33 health conditions at issue or if diagnosed
during the plan year. Unlike Maine, insurers
could not voluntarily reinsure other enrollees.
The program reimbursed 100% of all claims for
reinsured enrollees during the plan year; insurers
had to cede 100% of the premiums. The
program was funded in 2017 with $55 million
from general state premium taxes. Alaska
subsequently received a Section 1332 waiver
in July to continue the program in 2018. The
waiver application projects that lower premiums
will allow the program to be funded with $52
million in APTC pass through savings in 2018.13
An amendment to the American Health Care
Act proposed by Representative Palmer
in March would have established a Federal
Invisible High Risk Pool (FIHRP) patterned
after the Maine program. Insurers would cede
enrollees with one or more of eight health
conditions (or additional conditions specified by
the HHS Secretary) and could voluntary cede
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TABLE 4.
Comparison of Subsidy Approaches
Per enrollee
reinsurance

Invisible high
risk pool

Aggregate
coinsurance

Per enrollee
subsidy

Reduces idiosyncratic risk (random
variation in costly claims)
Reduces pricing risk (imprecise
forecasts of medical cost trends)
Reduces incentives
for risk selection
Maintains incentives for care
management, coordination,
and cost control
Minimizes administrative cost
and complexity
Note: Greater shading indicates greater potential effectiveness.

other enrollees based on a health statement.
Annual claims above $10,000 would be fully
reimbursed. Distinctively, providers would
be reimbursed for claims above this amount
at Medicare rates (which, according to one
actuarial study, would have a major impact on
the proposal’s ability to reduce premiums).14
Insurers would cede 90% of premiums for
reinsured enrollees, subject to a possible
adjustment based on cost control mechanisms.
No specific funding was proposed. The revised
amendment ultimately included in the bill would
simply have established a Federal Invisible Risk
Sharing Program with all program details to
be determined by the HHS Secretary and $15
billion in funding during 2018-2026.

COMPARISON
With external funding, all these approaches
have the potential to lower insurers’ average
costs net of the subsidy, lowering required
premiums, encouraging greater and more
balanced take up of coverage, and thus
contributing to even lower costs and premiums.
However, they do so in different ways. For
example, by requiring insurers to cede most
of the premiums for reinsured enrollees,
an invisible high risk pool is likely to permit
significantly greater reimbursement than
per enrollee reinsurance, while aggregate
coinsurance and per enrollee subsidies will
likely fund relatively modest amounts of total

claim costs. Hence, per enrollee reinsurance
can provide significant reimbursement of large
claims regardless of cause, invisible high risk
pools can provide substantial reimbursement
of claims at much lower thresholds for
enrollees with some conditions, and aggregate
coinsurance can provide relatively small
reimbursement of all claims.
Given this context, Table 4 provides a
qualitative and subjective comparison of the
alternatives’ potential effects on insurers’
risk and risk margins in premiums, insurers’
incentives, and program administrative costs
and complexity. The focus is on their relative
strengths and weaknesses as stabilization
mechanisms in a general environment of
guaranteed issue, age-adjusted community
rating, and risk adjustment. Political
considerations or interactions with other
potential changes to the ACA are not
considered.
Insurers’ risk and premiums. Insurers face
two broad types of risk that affect premiums:
1) random (idiosyncratic) variation in the
frequency and severity of claims, and 2)
pricing risk that arises because insurers need to
forecast trends in medical costs 6-18 months or
longer in the future. Idiosyncratic risk generally
declines as an insurer covers more enrollees in
given market or diversifies across geographic
regions and types of coverage. Commercial
reinsurance can also be purchased. In contrast,
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pricing or trend risk cannot be reduced simply
by selling more coverage in a given market,
but can be reduced by diversification across
markets. Actuarial and economic models
of insurance pricing imply that greater risk
requires insurers to include larger risk margins in
premiums. In addition to the direct impact of an
external subsidy, reinsurance approaches may
further reduce premiums by reducing insurers’
risk, although it may crowd out commercial
reinsurance.
Per enrollee reinsurance will likely have the
largest impact on insurers’ idiosyncratic risk
by providing substantial reimbursement of
relatively large claims regardless of cause.
Capping reimbursement for very large claims
helps preserve incentives for purchasing
commercial reinsurance. In contrast, invisible
high risk pools reimburse more frequent,
relatively modest, and less risky claims
associated with chronic conditions, and
they substantially eliminate incentives to
purchase commercial reinsurance for reinsured
enrollees. At the same time, they provide no
reimbursement for large idiosyncratic claims
for other enrollees. By reinsuring only a small
percentage of total claim costs, aggregate
coinsurance will have relatively little impact
on idiosyncratic risk. Likewise, per enrollee
subsidies will have little or no impact.
Each approach could reduce trend risk if the
subsidy adjusts over time to reflect overall
growth in claims costs or premiums, but the
magnitude would likely be modest. Invisible
high risk pools could have some advantage if
trend risk is above average for the specified
health conditions (for example, due to
unanticipated increases in the number of
enrollees with those conditions, or introduction
of new and expensive treatments).
Incentives for risk selection. The ACA’s
permanent risk adjustment program reduces
insurers’ incentives to avoid sicker-than-average
enrollees (risk selection) and the financial risk of
attracting a disproportionate number of such
enrollees (adverse selection). However, risk
adjustment is inherently imperfect and does not
eliminate these incentives and risks.

Per enrollee reinsurance can further reduce
these risks by partially reimbursing relatively
large claims not fully predicted by the risk
adjustment model. Aggregate coinsurance with
percentage reimbursement will have relatively
little impact. Per enrollee subsidies will have
no effect unless the subsidy amounts are risk
adjusted, as is done for Medicare Advantage,
and which presumably would replace the
current risk adjustment program.
Mandatory reinsurance of claim costs for
enrollees with specified conditions under an
invisible high risk pool would reduce selection
incentives and reduce the need for risk
adjustment for those conditions.15 It would
require significant coordination with the risk
adjustment program to reduce overlap and
redundancy. Permitting insurers to cede
enrollees voluntarily based on information
provided in a health statement could
supplement existing risk adjustment, if it targets
enrollees that are likely to have higher costs
than predicted by the risk adjustment model.
An ability to reinsure those enrollees voluntarily
would reduce incentives to avoid enrolling them
in the first place.
Incentives for care management,
coordination, and cost control. Any
stabilization program that reimburses a portion
of an insurer’s claim costs could reduce its
incentives for care management, coordination,
and cost control. Per enrollee subsidies have
a clear advantage on this dimension. The
disincentive effects of aggregate coinsurance
could be modest assuming that the percentage
of claims reimbursed is small, but aggregate
coinsurance would affect incentives for all
claims. Per enrollee reinsurance would affect
incentives for relatively large claims up to the
cap, but many of these claims involve acute
injuries or illness for which care management,
coordination, and cost control could be less
important.
Invisible high risk pools fare poorly on this
dimension. Substantial reimbursement of
claims for enrollees with specified chronic
conditions (or for enrollees voluntarily reinsured
based on health statements) risks significantly
undermining insurers’ incentives for care
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management, coordination, and cost control,
perhaps including incentives to negotiate
favorable terms with providers. This could
require extensive auditing, care protocols, or
other specialized programs to mitigate the
resulting disincentives.
Requiring that providers be reimbursed at
Medicare rates, as proposed in the original
Palmer amendment, essentially requires
participating providers to help finance the
subsidy to the individual market. In addition
to the question of how such an arrangement
would be administered, it would significantly
disrupt insurer-provider contracting, possibly
reducing the willingness of providers to contract
with individual market plans. It could also
exert upward pressure on negotiated prices
for services not subject to reimbursement
at Medicare rates, increasing insurers’ costs
for those services, and thus reducing the
program’s ability to lower premiums and expand
enrollment.
Administrative costs and complexity.
All approaches have administrative and
compliance costs. Greater complexity will
produce higher costs and increase the potential
for unintended consequences (including
gaming and opportunism over time). Per
enrollee reinsurance has a simple structure with
relatively straightforward administration and
compliance, with substantial prior experience
under the ACA’s transitional reinsurance
program. Aggregate coinsurance has a simple
structure with similar administrative and
compliance issues. Invisible high risk pools are
considerably more complex in structure, which
would increase administrative and compliance
costs. The administration and complexity of
per enrollee subsidies would depend on how
the amount of subsidy was determined and
updated over time.

CONCLUSION
Subsidized reinsurance represents a potentially
important tool to help stabilize individual health
insurance markets. External funding through
some form of reinsurance would reduce
insurers’ average expected costs net of the
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funding, lowering premiums and making coverage more affordable for people eligible for little or
no premium subsidy. Enrollment by younger/healthier enrollees would increase, putting further
downward pressure on premiums. Lower premiums would reduce premium subsidies under
current law, reducing the need for additional funding. For a given amount of funding, a particular
program’s efficacy will depend on how it affects insurers’ risk and risk margins in premiums;
incentives for risk selection; incentives for care management, coordination, and cost control;
and the costs and complexity of administration. These effects warrant careful consideration by
policymakers and additional analysis.
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